## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

This Document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited

		SECUR	SECRET ITY INFORMATION		÷	25X1
COUNTRY	USSR (Moscow	Oblast)/Ger	many	REPORT		
SUBJECT				DATE DISTR.	29 April 195	3 25X
DATE OF INFO.	Guided M USSR	issile Proje	cts at Putilo	REQUIREMENT	5	
PLACE ACQUIRED				REFERENCES		25 <b>X</b> 1
	This is	UNEVALUAT	ED Information			
	THE	THE APPRAISAL	ONS IN THIS REPORT OF CONTENT IS TEL R KEY SEE REVERSE)		41	
	<u> </u>					
YEAR RE-REVII	≡W		,			25X1.
Supp.						25 <b>X</b> 1.

Approved For Release 2009/02/06 : CIA-RDP80-00810A001000270008-3

(Note: Washington Distribution indicated By "X"; Field Distribution By "#".)

SECRET 25X1 -2-25X1 This general summary deals with guided missile reconstruction within the framework of the development program carried on by the Rhein-Metall Borsig plant at Berlin-Marienfelde and in the USSR. It deals with several types of rockets, ground-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-ground. This program was conducted on a large scale, especially during the war. The Berlin-Marienfelds plant was especially constructed for this purpose. After the collapse of Germany, the German scientists were obligated by the terms of the capitulation to furnish technical information on their previous work. This included rockets, guided missiles, glide bombs, radar-controlled air and ground rockets, and controlled flakrockets. The projects in the Soviet Union were 25X1 within this same framework of development. After about one and one-half or two years of working along these lines, remote control projects (Fernlenkung) were segregated from the German program and moved to the other side of the Ural Mountains.

25X1

SECRET 25X1

25X1

Great importance had been placed in Germany upon airborne air-to-air rockets for fighting bomber formations. This project was given number one priority in Germany during the last part of the war. All other tasks had to be sidetracked in favor of this program. The whole project was moved to Rhein-Metall Borsig range, including the automatic HF distance meter (range finder) (Hochfrequenzentfernungsmesser) and the proximity fuse program (Zuenderlaufblattstellung). The fact that the fuse of the rocket projectile exploded automatically at the most favorable distance is of great importance. In this respect, Germany developed another system for greater ranges. It was based upon the theory of fragmentation (Randsplitter) and rocket bombs filled with mines (small projectiles). In Germany it was generally understood that the incendiary fragmentation equipment could bring about decisive results in the phase of the war at that time, but that it would not be a permanent solution because, even at that time, superior equipment for planes, such as automatic fire-fighting equipment, was being developed. It was expected that sooner or later countermeasures for incendiary fragmentation equipment would be developed by the Allies. For this reason, incendiary fragmentation could only be effective for a rather short period of time. The goal of Germany at that time was the destruction of B-29's. Therefore, at the most, the explosive charge had to be increased by 30%. The next development in this line involved the insertion of small projectiles into the rocket bombs in place of incendiary fragmentation. This would have such an explosive effect that even a B-29 bomber was rendered incapable of continuing its flight. the explosive was 400 grams of tetramethylenetrinitramine (Hexogen) per projectile. The projectiles had small inherently stable bodies which traveled in the supersonic region. This opened up the road to success in this project.

25X1

There were many different versions of this project in the USSR. Some were shot toward the front, some toward the side, etc.

SECRET

			SECRET		25X1
			<b>*4-</b>	a. V ← C C A	25X1
					20,1.
	To the Moon of		ere also worked on 1		
	worked on in 1,200 meters	the Soviet Unio The and another who The 1,600 - 2 plant. The mis	re was one whose rai se range was approx ,000 meter missile :	nge was around imately 1,600 -	25X1 25X1
	Another proje In German thi	ect sis means "split"	was the "Monja" (Ger • The "Monja" is a development and was	small air-to-	)
	designed for be used by lo	fighting tanks ow-speed aircraf	and armored vehicles t (not over 300 km/)	s. It was to	
	device. The When the rock	rocket held sev	h a relatively simplen "mine" charges ( on "mine" charges ( on the "mines" rotated set at different any	ninen geschosse).	
	caused them t	to deviate from checkerboard pa	the line of sight in ttern about the tare	n such a manner get. By this	
	crepancies of	the rockets we:	sighting errors and re compensated for s rges would hit the i	and it was hoped	
	projectiles we tration of 15	vere equipped wi 50 - 200 mm armo:	th a hollow charge w r thickness. These lectrical detonator	vith a pene- projectiles	
-	activated thr	rough a pulse ger	nerator during the f	Clight. This	25 <b>X</b> 1
	the this projecti		d on a rather tight the Soviets belie		20/(1
	quite promisi would pose os	ing. The utilize ortain sighting	ation of this project problems with a rela	ctile, however, atively fast	
	plane. Radar cause there i	release of this is no specific re	s projectile is impresflecting point, in c	ractical be- contrast to	25 <b>X</b> 1

RCREM

. 25X1

	Seorey	5	
	<b>-</b> 5-	with the second	
plane-to-plane. at which to	aim.		

SECRET